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Abstract: A common point of contention among educators and economists is the likely effect a
free market would have on modern education. Most supporters of public schooling maintain that
the field would either be adversely affected by competition and choice, or that the effects would
be insubstantial. Conversely, a significant number of critics argue that education, like all other
human exchanges, would respond to market incentives with improved performance, increased
attention to the needs of families, and greater innovation. Historical evidence is presented
indicating that teachers and schools are indeed affected by the financial incentives of the systems
in which they operate. In particular, the data show that economic pressures have forced schools in
competitive markets to meet the needs of families, through methodological advancements and
diversity in curriculum, while centralized bureaucratic systems have generally been coercive and
pedagogically stagnant.
Introduction
  The debate over educational funding and administration is an old one. Writing to his
friend Tacitus almost two thousand years ago, the Roman lawyer Pliny the Younger described his
plan to establish a secondary school in his home town, but added that he had decided to pay only
one third of the total cost.
I would promise the whole amount were I not afraid that someday my gift might be
abused for someone's selfish purposes, as I see happen in many places where
teachers' salaries are paid from public funds. There is only one remedy to meet this
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evil: if the appointment of teachers is left entirely to the parents, and they are
conscientious about making a wise choice through their obligation to contribute to
the cost. (Pliny, 1969, p. 277-283)
  Over the last decade, proposals for introducing a degree of parental choice and
inter-school competition into education have abounded, particularly in the United States, the
United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand. In some cases, such plans are already in place.
With few exceptions, though, current choice programs pose barriers to the entry of new schools
and to the exit of unpopular ones, exclude religious and/or profit-making institutions, restrict
admissions and staffing policies, and otherwise control the supply and demand for education.
Though private schooling exists in most industrialized countries, there is only limited
competition at the primary and secondary levels. The comparatively heavy burden of tuition,
when compared to the "free" status of tax-supported schools, greatly limits the clientele for
private education. This in turn keeps the density of private institutions to a much lower level than
if government did not provide schools. As a result, there is no nation currently offering a truly
free and competitive market in education.
The Case Against
  As market-inspired reform has gained in popularity, it has been subjected to a great deal of
criticism. Attacks have been directed at the possible ill-effects of parental- choice, of for-profit
schools, and of market systems as a whole. The most often heard argument against a market is
that parents cannot be expected to make sound educational choices for their children, and must
instead leave the key decisions to experts. A significant number of parents, it is assumed, would
either fail to inform themselves about competing schools, or would base their choices on the
"wrong" criteria. This contention has been directed at the population as a whole (Carnegie
Foundation, 1992; Wells & Crain, 1992), and also at specific groups such as the poor or the
poorly-educated (Payne, 1993; Levin, 1991; Kozol, 1992). A related criticism is that racial and
economic isolation might be increased if families selected their schools based on race, ethnicity,
or social status (Cookson, 1994; Kozol, 1992).
  On the supply side, skeptics argue that for-profit schools with bold promises, flashy
advertising, and special programs would lure customers away from academically superior
institutions (Krashinsky, 1986). Murnane (1983), and others have noted the possibility of fraud in
voucher systems, in which corrupt principals could offer kick-backs to parents who chose their
institutions. Profit-making schools are also expected by some critics to reject difficult-to-educate
children, e.g. those with disabilities or serious discipline problems. According to Shanker and
Rosenberg (1992), these children would be more expensive to teach and hence would either be
expelled more readily or refused admission entirely.
  All these objections have in common the idea that education is fundamentally different
from other human exchanges, and that as a result, the natural checks and balances of the market
would fail to operate as they normally do. There is a second line of argument that takes the
opposite position, namely, that an educational market would fail precisely because it would
operate in the same way as other markets (Krashinsky, 1986). Education, so the argument goes,
benefits not only the students and their families, but their fellow citizens as well. These indirect
benefits are said to include social harmony, political stability, and a thriving economy. According
to Levin (1991), public school systems are capable of producing the aforementioned benefits,
while a competitive market of private schools could either not produce them at all, or do so only
at prohibitive regulatory expense.
  The remaining criticisms are based on the results of "limited choice" or "public school
choice" programs, which place many restrictions on schools and families, and generally do not
3 of 28
allow the participation of private or parochial schools. Smith and Meier (1995), for example,
argue that since programs allowing parents to choose from among different public schools have
failed to substantially increase student learning, the same should be expected of an unregulated
market. The experience with heavily regulated parental choice in the Netherlands (Brown, 1992;
Elmore, 1990) is also cited in arguments against the effectiveness of competition. In the United
States, comparisons between existing public and private schools have led Cookson (1994) to
conclude that a market would not improve education. The same author also reasons that since
private schools have rarely been included in choice programs, there is insufficient evidence to
support free market educational reform.
The Case in Favor
  Virtually all of the criticisms discussed above have been disputed by proponents of
parental choice. Members of the minority groups assumed to be incompetent or uninterested in
their children's education are foremost in defending their ability and prerogative to choose. State
representative Polly Williams (1994), herself an African-American single parent, championed a
private school choice plan in Milwaukee Wisconsin on the grounds that public schooling had
failed the urban community and that competitive private provision offered a superior education.
Similar arguments have been made by Native- American educator Ben Chavis (1994). Empirical
studies have shown that poor parents with limited formal education, from Massachusetts (Fossey,
1994) to the mountain villages of Nepal (Pande, 1977), can and do choose schools on rational
grounds (see also U.S. Dept. of Education, 1995; Martinez et al, 1994).
  Arguments that racial segregation would increase under a free market have been
challenged from two different perspectives. The late James Coleman (1990) observed that racial
segregation within the American public school system was greater than that among private
schools. So, while the percentage of African-American students in the public sector is greater
than the percentage in the private sector, public schools are more likely to be all-white or
all-black than their private counterparts. Opposing the very essence of the segregation claim are
educators such as Derrick Bell (1987), who believe that the freedom to create separate schools
for African Americans would be a boon rather than a hardship.
  The assertion that private schools might defraud parents is commonly countered with the
argument that such problems exist everywhere, including public schools. The cases of East St.
Louis (Schmidt, 1995) and Washington D.C. are notorious examples. Rinehart and Lee (1991)
note that a competitive market would at least exert pressure on a school to deal honestly and
fairly with parents in order to maintain a healthy reputation, while the public monopoly offers
educators no such incentive. Along the same lines, John Coons (1991) has observed that public
schooling has not engendered the external benefits of social harmony and effective democracy
assumed by its defenders. The American experience of Protestant bias in the education of
immigrants at the turn of the century, as well as government-enforced racial segregation, are
presented as evidence of this claim. Coons also contends that by removing the coercive element
from school selection and allowing parents to choose for themselves, the goal of effective
democracy would be strengthened.
 To resolve the issue of difficult-to-educate children, Myron Lieberman (1991), investigated
the current practices among private institutions. He found that rather than focusing on
easy-to-educate students, the single largest group of for-profit schools actually serves the
disabled. Studies have also suggested that urban private schools are able to maintain a higher
level of discipline than their public counterparts with few if any admissions requirements, and
only infrequent student expulsions (Blum, 1985).
  For the supporter of free markets, objections based on public school choice programs are
seen as misguided. To function effectively markets require significant competition, the lure of
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profit-making, and a minimum of restrictions on buyers and sellers. Few if any of these criteria
hold among existing choice programs (OECD, 1994), and as a result it is argued that they cannot
be expected to show any significant benefits (Lieberman, 1989).
  The above rebuttals aside, the economic case for an educational market rests on two main
presumptions: that monopoly control of education leads to coercion, indifference to the needs of
families, and stagnation in the form and content of instruction, while competition and the profit
motive would lead to greater quality and efficiency. The first case has been made at both national
and school levels. While inflation-adjusted per-pupil spending in U.S. public schools tripled
between 1959/60 and the present (U. S. Department of Education, 1993), test scores either held
constant or declined (Sowell, 1993; Boaz, 1991). Comparisons between public school
administrations and those of the private Catholic sector have shown the public bureaucracy to
employ as many as thirty times the number of administrators per-pupil (Boaz, 1991). On a school
by school basis, Eric Hanushek (1986; 1989) studied correlations between spending and student
achievement only to find that the relationship was not statistically significant. Similar results
have been reported by Childs & Shakeshaft (1986). Because of the absence of any truly
competitive market in education, little direct contemporary evidence is available to demonstrate
its effects on efficiency or achievement. In those cases where a limited degree of competition
does exist, however, Hoffer et al. (1990), Borland and Howsen (1993), and others have found
small but significant positive effects. Outside the field of education, the superiority of markets to
monopolies is widely accepted, and Winston (1993) has demonstrated that reductions in
regulation are generally associated with lower prices and better services for consumers, and even
yield higher revenues for producers.
The Present Work
  As can be gleaned from the arguments cited above, the debate over a market in education
has drawn almost entirely from the limited body of contemporary evidence. With the exception
of E.G. West's (1994) analysis of 19th century England, the historical evidence regarding market
vs. monopoly provision in education has been largely ignored. Education, however, is not a
recent invention. Two and a half thousand years of schooling, from the informal to the
regimented, from complete parental freedom to totalitarian domination, have preceded current
practice. The study of educational history thus offers a wealth of insights into the effects of
monetary incentives and centralized administration on the actions of parents and educators.
  The next section looks at the educational experiences of four historical periods and places:
classical Greece, Germany at the Reformation, England during the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, and France after the Revolution. This selection is a more or less representative sample
from a larger survey of the subject currently in progress. The most valuable lessons these
histories have to teach us concern the relationship between school governance and school quality.
In particular, they highlight the differences between markets and centralized bureaucratic school
systems on three important measures of school performance: how well they respond to and
satisfy the demands of parents and students (e.g. through innovation and diversity in curriculum),
the degree to which they benefit their students directly (e.g. higher literacy, job/life skills), and
their indirect benefits to the rest of society (e.g. thriving economy, social harmony).
Educational Choice: Over Time and Around the World
Greece
 Formal education made perhaps its earliest appearance in China, well before the first
millennium B.C., but the most suitable starting point to our study lies half a world away, in
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Greece. Unlike the uniform system of the Chinese, ancient Greek education developed along
disparate and conflicting lines. This contrast, between parental freedom and state control, was
best represented by the city-states of Athens and Sparta. By the fifth century B.C., schooling in
both of these societies had become a general preparation for citizenship and adulthood, but the
content and delivery of that preparation differed dramatically. It is with this organizational
juxtaposition that we begin.
  With the exception of requiring two years of mandatory military training, the government
played little or no role in Athenian schooling. Socrates is said to have described the practice of
the day as follows:
When boys seem old enough to learn anything, their parents teach them whatever
they themselves know that is likely to be useful to them; subjects which they think
others better qualified to teach, they send them to school to learn, spending money
upon this object. (Freeman, 1904)
  Anyone who wished might open a school, setting whatever curriculum and tuition they
deemed appropriate. The schools were operated as private enterprises, and so the subjects taught
and fees charged were established by what parents wanted their children to learn, and how much
they were willing to pay for that learning. Choosing a teacher was considered an important
decision, and it was expected that a person would consult with friends and relatives, deliberating
for several days on the matter (Plato, 1937). Competition to attract parents and students seems to
have held costs to a relatively low level, since even the poorest families are thought to have sent
their sons to school for a few years, despite the absence of state funding (Cole, 1960). It should
be noted, however, that most girls and much of the slave population received little or no
education in Athens, as in so many cultures up to modern times.
  Schooling began at the age of six or seven, but wealthy parents likely sent their children to
school earlier and kept them there for longer than did parents with limited means. This occurred
not only because of the need to pay school fees, but also because poor and middle class families
could not afford to support their children indefinitely, and so had to ensure that they learned a
trade or craft through apprenticeship; an experience quite distinct from schooling. Even in this
time-honored tradition, however, the Athenians were innovators. When a boy was apprenticed to
a tradesman other than his father, his parents would draw up a statement indicating which skills
they expected him to be taught and the tradesman received payment only if he provided the
stipulated training (Freeman, 1904).
  At the elementary level, Athenian parents sought three general categories of education for
their children: gymnastics, music, and literacy. Competence in each of these areas was of great
practical importance. Stamina, strength, and agility meant the difference between life and death
at a time when wars were a constant threat, and every able bodied male citizen was expected to
serve in the army. To understand the importance of musical instruction it must be remembered
that Greek culture had been orally transmitted, largely in song, for centuries prior to the rise of
Athens. Just as a grasp of reading and important works of literature are crucial to modern
education, so was the knowledge and appreciation of epic poetry important in the 5th and 4th
centuries B.C. Even as the social mores embodied in the oral tradition were codified and written
down, the value Athenian citizens placed on music and poetry remained high. Writing began to
rise in significance in the 5th century, as a tool for improving the political and judicial systems,
for accurately recording the works of scientists, playwrights, and philosophers, and for making
economic transactions more reliable. In the minds of the city's more philosophically oriented
citizens, this combination of physical, musical, and intellectual development also satisfied an
appreciation for harmony and balance in the human character.
  While music and reading were probably taught in the same school, the study of
gymnastics was carried out at a special location, called a palaestra, which consisted of changing
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rooms and an exercise field. The gymnastics teacher was expected to have an organized method
of instruction which would improve stamina, strength, and agility, while keeping the risk of
injury to a minimum. Physical trainers also seem to have to provided their students with
nutritional advice (Plato, 1937). Children began their gymnastics training by performing aerobic
exercise routines to build stamina and flexibility. As their bodies and skills developed, they were
taught javelin and discus tossing, a variety of ball-games and other sports, and also wrestling and
boxing.
  At writing school, then as now, the child was first taught to recognize and write the letters
of the alphabet. For the youngest children, this was done through song, and there is even a
fragmentary play that survives from late in the 4th century B.C. in which the actors represented
letters and formed syllables by pairing up with one another in the appropriate poses (Freeman,
1904). Once the child had learned his alphabet, he was taught to write on a folding wooden tablet
covered with wax, into which he would etch letters with the pointed end of a stylus, and rub them
out with the wide end. At first the writing teacher would lightly trace the letters, and the student
would then scratch his pen over them in order to learn how to draw their shapes. Once he had
mastered this step, the child would begin to write on his own (Plato, 1937).
  As Athenian culture broadened and developed, the elementary school curriculum
developed with it. More and more parents began to seek drawing and painting instruction for
their children, and by Aristotle's time this had become a common option. Several generations
later, these arts were considered a fourth core subject area, being studied by virtually all pupils
(Marrou, 1965). Adaptation to the changing demands of parents and students was in fact a
hallmark of Athenian education. Each step in the evolution of the society was matched by a
corresponding change in the offerings of educators. The philosophers and scientists of the day
were continually pushing forward the frontiers of human understanding, establishing in their
wake a demand for a deeper and more comprehensive level of education. At the same time, the
democratic franchise was extended to an ever larger segment of the population, and the powers of
the assembly were growing apace. In order to win popular support in this vibrant democracy, it
became necessary for would-be statesmen to not only offer compelling policies, but also to
deliver them with clarity and elegance. Training in oratory was thus an important political asset.
Together, the emerging educational demands of politics and science made higher-level teaching
an economically viable endeavor. Athenians not only wanted to become better educated, they
were willing to pay for it. This market niche was quickly filled by a new entrepreneurial class of
teachers, known as sophists, anxious to earn a living from their scholarly pursuits.
  At first, when the demand for higher-learning in any one community was still limited, the
sophists traveled from city to city, holding forth on whatever topic they felt confident to teach,
and for which there were eager pupils. When the flow of students had ebbed at a given location,
they would once again resume their journey. Recruiting new pupils was always an important task
for the sophists, since their livelihoods depended on it. The most common technique used to this
end was the presentation of free public lectures in the town square, which allowed them to
demonstrate their talents and whet the intellectual appetites of prospective students. Fortunately
for the sophists, the spread of learning served not to diminish but rather to increase the demand
for their services. As more and more people became better educated, the value of an education
increased. It became necessary for anyone with hopes of public office or success in law or
commerce to expand their educational horizons. This trend was not lost on elementary school
masters who eventually began to diversify into the new secondary and higher education markets
by offering advanced classes to adults and children over the age of fourteen. For many years,
however, the bulk of higher-education was still carried out by the wandering professors.
  While rhetoric and the sciences were the most common fields of study, the range of
subjects taught by the sophists was astonishingly diverse. The curious student might choose from
"mathematics (including arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy), grammar, etymology, geography,
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natural history [i.e. biology, horticulture, etc.], the laws of meter and rhythm, history..., politics,
ethics, the criticism of religion, mnemonics, logic, tactics and strategy, music, drawing and
painting, scientific athletics." (Freeman, 1904). Lectures were held in open spaces outdoors, in
the homes of the teachers, and occasionally in buildings borrowed or leased for the purpose.
There appear to have been no age restrictions on these lectures, and so any student both
interested and capable of participating was permitted to do so.
  Gradually, as the higher educational market matured, a few fixed schools were established
in Athens. In addition to Plato's Academy and Aristotle's Lyceum, neither of which charged a fee
due to the wealth and preferences of their founders, several for-profit secondary schools were in
existence by the turn of the fourth century B.C. Only a few of these were sufficiently famous to
come down to us by name, and of these the best known is the school of Isocrates. Contrary to
Plato, Isocrates argued that knowledge without application was useless. He said, "I hold that man
wise who can usually think out the best course to take and that man a philosopher who seeks to
gain that insight."(Hamilton, 1957) Though reportedly too shy to become prominent in public
life, Isocrates was extremely successful-both financially and by popular acclaim-in teaching the
art of public speaking to others. This, coupled with his pragmatic lessons on applied philosophy
and mathematics, attracted a significant body of students to his lectures. A greater number, it
seems, than was to be found at the Academy. More remarkable though, and in a way more
emphatically Athenian, was the school of Aspasia.
  Defying the norms and prejudices of the day, this Milesian-born woman set up shop in
Athens teaching philosophy and rhetoric, and unabashedly advocated the liberation and education
of the city's women. According to Plato, her lectures attracted such towering figures as Socrates
and Pericles, the latter of whom eventually became her lover and life-long companion. When
asked of his ability to improvise a speech (in Plato's dialogue "Menexenus"), Socrates avowed
that he was up to the task, and referring to Aspasia, added "I have an excellent mistress in the art
of rhetoric-she who has made so many good speakers."(Plato, 1937) The philosopher goes on to
suggest that one of the most famous speeches in ancient history, the funeral oration by Pericles,
was actually written by her, and though there is little substantiation of this claim in the historical
literature it certainly implies a healthy respect for her abilities on the part of Plato. Demonstrating
the breadth of her appeal, Aspasia's school also attracted a large number of girls from well-to-do
families, an emancipatory innovation that drew harsh criticism from many in the older generation
(Durant, 1939). What is perhaps most significant about this case is the fact that, despite the
intensely sexist climate of the city, the majority was not able to prevent Aspasia from opening her
school and reaching out to the disenfranchised female population.
  In stark contrast to the freedom and diversity of Athens, the central idea of Spartan society
was that individuals and families should not be left to make their own decisions in matters of
importance such as education, marriage, or employment. Instead, Spartans were called upon to
second their own interests to the collective will of the people, as interpreted by their part
aristocratic, part democratically- elected government. Supporting this sweeping centralization of
authority was a monolithic educational apparatus run by the state, to which all citizens were
compelled to send their sons (here again, the education of girls received less attention than that of
boys). At age seven, all the male children were separated from their families and brought to live
in school dormitories. The nature of their learning environment is well-captured by the terms
used to describe them. A troop of boys was referred to as a "boua", the same word used for a herd
of cattle, and from each herd, a dominant boy was chosen to act as herd-leader. With satisfying
consistency, their head teacher was called "paidonomus", or boy-herdsman. This individual was
chosen from the aristocracy, and granted the authority to train the boys, and to harshly discipline
them if any failed to follow his instructions. In his efforts, he was assisted by two "floggers"
armed with whips (Xenophon, 1988).
  The children were administered an education consisting almost exclusively of sports,
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endurance training, and fighting. When questions were posed to the students, a prompt reply was
expected, and those who failed to answer to the teacher's satisfaction were regarded as
incompetent, and given a bite on the thumb or some similar punishment. Arithmetic is not
mentioned as a part of the curriculum by any of Sparta's chroniclers, and few people could count
beyond the smallest numbers. Students were perhaps introduced to letters, but certainly "no more
than was necessary,"(Plutarch, 1988) and since books and written law were virtually non-existent
in Sparta, this could not have been much at all. Isocrates did not hesitate to observe that the
Spartans "have fallen so far behind our common culture and learning that they do not even try to
instruct themselves in letters." (Isocrates, 1982) Speech and writing were further discouraged by
an outright prohibition on learning rhetoric, the violation of which was a punishable offense
(Sextus Empiricus, 1987). Educational innovation, whether it involved additions to the
curriculum or the adoption of new techniques in the existing wrestling and military training, were
strictly forbidden.
  At dinner time boys were fed simple hearty meals, but were served deliberately small
portions so that they would constantly be hungry if this were their only source of sustenance. To
supplement this meager fare, children were encouraged to steal. Theft was in fact a central
feature of Spartan education. The city's leaders believed that, if you want an army that thinks
nothing of pillaging neighboring states, it is exceedingly helpful to have citizens accustomed to
robbing their neighbors. While those caught stealing were severely punished, it was for failing to
get away with the crime, rather than for attempting it in the first place. Skill in theft was
considered a noble accomplishment, and, according to Isocrates, it paved the way to the highest
political offices (Isocrates, 1982). Of course, students were encouraged to steal primarily from
the subjugated peasant and slave populations rather than from other citizens.
  By the time they had reached the age of eighteen, Spartan youths were tough, fit, ruthless,
but also inexperienced. The missing element in their training was provided by an institution
known as the "krypteia." Young men were gathered into bands and dispatched to the countryside
where they would have to hunt and steal to survive. Their primary mission, however, was to
attack their own peasant population whenever the opportunity arose, killing those who had the
audacity to defend themselves. This savagery apparently seemed criminal even to the Spartans,
for the elected officials would annually declare war on their own serfs, giving the bloodshed at
least a veneer of legality.
  Having described the different approaches to schooling in Athens and Sparta, we can look
to the conditions of their people for a reflection of the effects of those systems. We cannot, of
course, attribute all of the differences between Athenian and Spartan civilizations to their
schools, but formal education clearly played an influential role.
  To the classical Greeks, Athens was the "school of Hellas" and the "metropolis of
wisdom." Of the three most influential philosophers in Western antiquity-Socrates, Plato, and
Aristotle-the first two were Athenian citizens, and the third a resident alien, studying and
teaching in the city for much of his life. The greatest Western historian of the period, Thucydides,
was Athenian, and his successor, Xenophon, though an ardent admirer of Spartan militancy, was
born and raised just over fifteen miles from Athens. Sophocles and Aristophanes, from whose
minds flowed the most profound tragedy and biting satire in the literature of ancient Greece, were
also natives of the city of Athena.
  But what of the public at large? One particularly useful indication of the general level of
learning in the city is the proportion of citizens who were literate. A variety of techniques have
been used to estimate Athenian literacy, primarily centering on the reading required for
participation in public life, the archeological evidence of writing on pottery fragments and the
like, and references to reading in contemporary plays and prose works. By all accounts, Athens
was the most literate society in the Western world at that time. William Harris, the most skeptical
and influential recent writer on the subject, is at great pains to demonstrate that literacy was not
9 of 28
as widespread in ancient times as had been previously thought, but even he relents somewhat in
his discussion of Athens. He writes that "among the well to do, practically all males must have
been literate" (Harris, 1989, p. 103). Harris neglects to offer an estimate of literacy among urban
Athenian citizens, saying only that at least 15% of the male population as a whole, including the
surrounding areas, was literate. Using his own data and arguments, it is fair to say that perhaps
twice that percentage of city-dwellers were able to read, and most of these would have been able
to write as well. Conversely, literacy among the rural population was probably at about half the
overall level. This difference was due in large part to the greater frequency with which farming
families required the labor of their children, thus leaving them fewer years during which to attend
school. Similar constraints affected the urban poor, who had to apprentice their children to a craft
at perhaps the age of 11 or 12.
  Pedagogical freedom and market pressures both allowed and encouraged Athenian
educators to make great strides. Independent Athenian schools were the first to introduce games
as a pedagogical tool, and to reduce the use of corporal punishment-ubiquitous in Egypt and
Sparta-to the exception rather than the rule. Elementary schools altered their curricula to meet
changing parental demands, and an entirely new educational institution, secondary schooling,
was brought into being as a result of market forces. In the words of Adam Smith:
The demand for such [higher] instruction produced, what it always produces, the
talent for giving it; and the emulation which an unrestrained competition never fails
to excite, appears to have brought that talent to a very high degree of perfection.
(Smith, 1994, p. 837)
  These achievements, so far ahead of contemporary practice, went hand in hand with the
spirit of freedom and community that pervaded Athenian society. Without resort to government
intervention or coercion, Athens enjoyed not only an explosion of artistic, literary, and scientific
work, but also a thriving economy. The depth and breadth of Athenian commercial life was by
far the greatest of any city in Europe at the time, comparing favorably even with cities that
existed centuries later. By allowing youths and adults to pursue a wide range of studies, the
Athenians fostered a labor-market of exceptional diversity. The existence of skilled
apprenticeships ensured a talented pool of craftsmen, while training in writing and mathematics
made possible ever larger and more complex business transactions. Isocrates observed that "the
articles which it is difficult to get, one here, one there, from the rest of the world, all these it is
easy to buy in Athens." (Durant, 1939) In support of its vigorous shipping industry, Athens even
offered a variety of financial and insurance services, which required both literacy and numeracy.
As economic historian Rondo Cameron points out:
Some cities, such as Athens, concentrated a number of commercial and financial
functions within their boundaries in much the same way as Antwerp, Amsterdam,
London, and New York did in subsequent eras. Banking, insurance, joint-stock
ventures, and a number of other economic institutions that are associated with later
epochs already existed in embryonic form in classical Greece (1993, p. 35).
  The picture which comes down to us of Sparta in the 5th and 4th centuries B.C. is a very
different one. Parents had no direct say in the education or upbringing of their children, having to
cede their responsibilities and desires to a single, monolithic system. Innovations in language
instruction and even physical training were suppressed by central control, leaving teachers
without autonomy or flexibility. Sparta had virtually no science or literature, and little art. Her
legacy to modern times is negligible, apart from being a beacon to totalitarians at the time of the
French revolution and the rise of the Third Reich in Germany. Social stability, the result of
voluntary association in Athens, was maintained by innumerable forms of government coercion
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and regulation, particularly in education.
  Though one or two historians have attempted to show the existence of literacy among the
common people in Sparta, there is a dearth of evidence to support their claims. Apart from the
kings and perhaps a few generals and magistrates-who communicated with one another on "code
sticks"-the Spartans were an illiterate people. Their economy was basic, and far more dependent
upon slave and serf labor than that of Athens. The citizen class was allowed only to train for war
in the state schools, and could neither acquire a broader learning nor apprentice themselves to
skilled tradesmen. Trade was in fact actively discouraged by the Spartan government, in an effort
to keep its people focused on an ascetic military lifestyle. In this, they were eminently successful.
Germany and The Reformation
  In a bustling German town, in the year 1500, a public notice proclaimed that "Everybody
now wants to read and to write" (Schwickerath, 1904). Though this was still something of an
exaggeration, it captured the spirit of the time. With the invention of the printing press, books
became cheaper and more widespread throughout Europe, making literacy in the common
languages of its people a practical and valuable skill for the first time in a thousand years. It also
came within reach of a larger segment of the population, thanks to the diversification of the
economy and the appearance of a small but growing middle class who could afford both books
and teachers' fees.
  Since the fall of the Roman Empire, education in the West had been the prerogative of the
Catholic clergy, and Latin had been their language of choice. Naturally, as the demand for
literacy grew, the middle classes turned first to this traditional seat of learning for instruction.
Two factors soon changed this practice. The most notable was that an increasing number of
citizens wished to learn German rather than Latin, and the church had little inclination to oblige
them. As a result, the demand for German literacy was met by entirely private schools that
introduced both children and adults to the perennial basics for a small fee. These popular
independent schools spread rapidly in the larger towns, but were less numerous in villages and
rural areas. The second cause of change in the provision of education was the desire of the public
for greater control over the schools. As townspeople still favoring an education in Latin
contributed more generously to their local parish educational funds, building new schools and
retaining more teachers, they sought proportionately greater control over school staffing and
curriculum. This did not sit at all well with the clerics who had until then been responsible for
such decisions, and they often resisted any circumscription of their authority. Many considered it
the fundamental right of the Church to control education. In the majority of cases, however, the
citizens eventually won out, and city councils became the primary authorities over the schools
formerly run by the clergy. Because clerics made up the vast majority of those capable of giving
Latin instruction, most teachers in "city schools," as they came to be called, continued to be
members of the clergy. School costs at these quasi-public institutions were paid for with a
combination of tuition fees and taxes, broadening access, while still leaving some incentive for
the students or their parents to ensure that they were receiving value for their money. The new
trends towards private schooling and local community control were derailed, however, by one of
the largest social upheavals in European history.
  The Reformation threw German schooling into chaos. Schools staffed or run by the clergy
closed down as monks and nuns abandoned their convental lives in droves. The process was
accelerated by the nobility, who seized the opportunity to close all the monasteries that remained,
excepting those that had adopted Protestantism. Finally, after several decades, new schools
started to appear. Free enterprise elementary schools, which had been the least affected by the
turmoil, were the first to recover. The printing industry had been central to the success of
Protestant reform, and the demand for instruction in reading and writing that it had helped to
11 of 28
spread remained strong. The efforts of private citizens to educate themselves were once again cut
short, however, by one of Luther's close associates; a scholar named Melanchthon. Apparently
believing that he knew what was best for the people, Melanchthon called for the creation of a
government-run school system. With the help of Luther and the nobility of various German
states, he was successful, and soon the existing private elementary schools were joined by state
institutions. Because they were paid for by taxes rather than tuition fees, the new schools tended
to make private instruction financially burdensome. Parents who wished to send their children to
a private school had to pay both for it and for the state schools as well. Private schools were
further discouraged by the attitudes and actions of the new state educational authorities, who
derided and persecuted them (Paulsen, 1908). Attempts were even made to legislate private
instruction out of existence (Cole, 1960), and in response they were sometimes forced to carry on
their classes clandestinely. Though these "hedge schools" survived into the 17th and 18th
centuries, they were marginalized by the growing state educational system.
  Melanchthon's vision for mass education was inspired by the guiding principle of the
reformation: the direct interpretation of the bible by individuals. The practice, however, was
substantially different from its inspiration. If scriptural analysis was left to laymen, so the
argument went, "incorrect" interpretations might result. The definition of what was incorrect was
of course established by the leaders of the Reformation. As a result, reading, writing, and religion
were taught using a pair of elementary catechisms composed by Luther. While he genuinely
wished to improve the lot of children, Luther's views on what sort of education was acceptable
were narrow and authoritarian. He felt that secular schools would lead to moral bankruptcy, and
believed that parents should be compelled to teach their children according to his own views.
Despite the spread of independent schools, he wrote to the reigning political authorities that: "It
is to you, my lords, to take this task [education] in hand, for if we leave it to the parents, we will
die a hundred times over before the thing would be done." (Chartier, 1976) Education once more
became religious indoctrination, only this time it was legally mandated by the state. Fortunately
for the majority of students who would not go on to a life in the clergy or government service,
elementary instruction was given in their mother tongue.
  The fate of Germany's city-schools was much the same as that of its private elementary
schools. Political authorities at the state level were only slightly less hostile to local government
institutions than they were to private enterprises. Pushed and squeezed by the state bureaucrats,
city-schools found their curricula and attendance ever more limited. At the same time, new state-
run institutions were created and given special privileges which the city-schools were not
permitted to offer, such as the right to send their graduates on to university or into particular
professions. Occasionally, city-schools were simply taken over by the state out of hand. In the
late 16th and early 17th centuries, their pupils were mostly hand- picked by local lords, with the
remaining openings allotted to the children of townspeople. Turning away from the popular
movement towards education in German, and back to the classical languages so dear to the hearts
of reformers, school regulations typically ordained that the new state secondary schools would
teach in Latin. Their curriculum, too, culminated in the study of classical literature and scripture.
Graduates were expected to converse fluently in Latin and have a passing acquaintance with
Greek. In this end they were quite successful, but their achievement came at a cost to German
culture and society.
  Just prior to the Reformation there had been significant overlap in the education of the
nobility and the training of at least the more avid youngsters from the middle classes. Education
had been in the mother tongue for all but the clergy, and literate families in the towns and
villages could and did share in the prose of their countrymen. Legal proceedings had also been
held in German, allowing citizens to participate directly in any court actions which affected them.
Once the strictly Latin secondary school system of the reformers was imposed, however, German
gradually disappeared as a language of law and culture (Paulsen, 1908) This caused an ever
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greater rift between the uneducated masses and the learned elite which persisted for hundreds of
years.
On the Eve of the Modern World: England
  After the civil wars of the mid 17th century, England was a country without a King. To
cement their victory, the Puritan rebels abolished the House of Lords, withdrew the political
powers of the bishops, and executed King Charles I on the grounds that his continued existence
might encourage royalist revolt. They had little time to enjoy their new- found authority,
however, as they were themselves deposed only eleven years later. In 1660 the monarchy was
restored, and all its political and religious trappings with it. To forestall any further Puritan
uprisings a host of restrictive laws were put in place against them. The Corporation Act of 1661
restricted public office to Anglicans, and it was quickly followed by the broader Act of
Uniformity. Under this new legislation, educators at all levels were forced to sign a declaration of
conformity to the Church of England's liturgy, and to give their oaths of allegiance to the crown.
Nonconformists were thus prohibited from teaching in public and private schools, and their
ministers were forbidden from coming within five miles of where they had once preached.
  As political winds shifted over the next hundred years, the repressive religious and
educational laws were at times ignored and at others reasserted. Having been forced to retreat
from public life, the Puritans focused their energies on trade and commerce, expanding the
middle class and thus the market for innovative schools. To satisfy this growing demand, a few
private, fee-charging academies began to appear, founded illegally in many instances by non-
conformist ministers who had been ejected from the teaching profession. In an effort to attract
both dissenting and Anglican families, these schools offered an updated, predominantly secular
curriculum with an emphasis on English, mathematics, and the natural sciences. One such
school, operating in Tottenham in the 1670s, taught "geometry, arithmetic, astronomy and
geography, with gardening, dancing, singing and music" in addition to English and some Latin
(Lawson & Silver, 1973). Traditional endowed grammar schools, on the other hand, assured of a
steady income independent of their ability to attract students, continued to provide the same
classical Latin training they had offered since the Middle Ages. The polarization of these two
forms of schooling, and their respective fates, clearly illustrate the role of market incentives in
the educational process.
  The continued growth and diversification of the economy dramatically widened the
disparity between the content of traditional education and the needs of the commercial and
professional classes. Together with the decline of the Church as an employer, this shift
diminished whatever economic advantage the old syllabus might have conferred. Critics
denounced the grammar schools as moribund and irrelevant, while parents increasingly sought
more practical alternatives. As a result, the conservative endowed schools began to lose middle
class pupils to the few private academies that had sprung up in the late sixteen-hundreds. Within
a few decades this burgeoning change had solidified into a steep recession for traditional
education, and a proliferation of new private academies. In the 18th century, grammar schools
continued their descent, as few new ones were opened, some closed, and the rest saw their
enrollments drop significantly. When Nicholas Carlisle conducted his multi-year investigation of
hundreds of endowed schools in the early 19th century, he found many of them had lost touch
with their prospective customers, and showed visible signs of decay. In Stourbridge, for example,
he found that the school had taught only a trifling number of students over the preceding forty
years, "as Classical learning is in little estimation in a commercial town." (Carlisle, 1818, v. II, p.
773) Despite the fact that Stourbridge's grammar school sometimes had no pupils at all, both its
head and assistant masters continued to draw their full salaries. This was in fact not unusual, as
masters, once awarded tenure and assigned a fixed salary, were virtually impossible to remove,
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even in cases of serious neglect (Lawson & Silver, 1973).
  Endowed grammar schools were not entirely beyond the reach of market forces, however.
In the many cases where the endowment was low, schoolmasters generally took the financially
expedient steps of recruiting private pupils or taking on outside employment to increase their
income, necessarily reducing the time they had for their endowment students. Others, such as
those at Donington and Cuckfield, taught only one or two "free" (endowment) students, while
conducting private lessons with scores of paying students on the foundations' premises (Carlisle,
1818, p. 345, 597). Finally there were masters who simply converted the school buildings into
private residences, took no pupils of any kind, and continued to draw their stipend. Despite these
systemic problems, there were schools led by dedicated masters able to make do with their
allotted salary, that continued to instruct their pupils on the language and literature of ancient
Greece and Rome. To the extent that endowed schools modernized their curricula to attract
students, however, it was due primarily to the financial imperative.
  In direct proportion to the decline in health and popularity of endowed grammar schools,
private institutions grew and flourished. Subjects long ignored by the grammar schools began to
appear, and soon entirely new ones were added. Arithmetic and geography were among the first,
and these were joined by anatomy, biology, bookkeeping, economics, surveying, naval studies,
and many others. While sometimes maintaining vestiges of the traditional curriculum, private
institutions usually allotted them less time and importance than the new subjects. At St. Domingo
House School, for example, Latin instruction was given but only after the children had received
several years of training in French and German (Roach, 1986, p. 127). Not only were the subjects
new, but the methods were often innovative as well. In keeping with the applied scientific nature
of many of the courses, experiments using telescopes, microscopes and other devices
complemented the familiar teaching methods. The teachers of Hill Top School conducted lessons
with marbles to give children an intuitive grasp of arithmetic before introducing them to numbers
and word problems. Physical surveying was used to teach trigonometry at the same institution
(Roach, 1986, p. 124). One of the most concrete signs of the different attitude of the private
schools was that many catered to girls, while grammar schools did not. Though the curriculum
for girls was sometimes less academically ambitious, and always included ample emphasis on
morals, manners, and domestic skills, it was at least a step forward.
  For the very poorest families, who usually had no interest in a classical education and who
could not afford the tuition at the better private institutions, two options remained; religious
charity schools and private Dame schools. Though charity schools generally taught basic reading
skills, they suffered from the same conflict of goals as the grammar schools. Just as the wealthy
donors who endowed grammar schools generally insisted on a traditional Latin curriculum, the
middle-class religious societies that funded charity schools had ideas all their own as to what the
poor should learn, and these only rarely took into account the interests of the poor themselves.
The central purpose was always to inculcate the moral and religious views of the sponsors. A
widely held view among religious societies was that "Reading will help to mend people's morals,
but writing is not necessary." (Smith, 1931, p. 53) An additional problem with religious charity
schools was that the teachers were appointed and supported by religious authorities, rather than
by the educational marketplace. Since those overseeing charity schools rarely had children
attending them, there was little incentive for them to ensure the teacher's competency. Sometimes
sound selections were nonetheless made, but in the worst cases masters were appointed who
would never have been able to draw paying students. In Yorkshire, for instance, a "very deaf and
ignorant" teacher was appointed by the parochial authorities "that he may not be burdensome to
them for his support." (Lawson & Silver, 1973) Not surprisingly, the appeal of these schools was
limited. Despite the fact that private schools charged tuition, "the subsidized, endowed and
charity schools of Manchester attracted only 8 percent of all those attending schools and there
were empty places available." (Royle, 1990)
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  The ubiquitous Dame schools, usually located in the home of an elderly local widow, also
varied widely in quality based on the knowledge and skills of individual teachers. Competition
generally kept the fees for such schools at a minimal level, however, and the freedom of families
to chose among different teachers ensured that those who failed to meet their client's expectations
could remain in business for only a short time. Despite their many shortcomings, Dame schools
taught far more students from even the poorest classes than did charity schools, and, as we shall
see below, they succeeded in most cases at conveying the rudiments the English language.
  The major religious denominations were not entirely beyond the reach of competitive
incentives, however, as is evidenced by the rise of the monitorial system. Monitorial schools, in
which the brightest students taught all the rest, drew enormous interest around the turn of the
19th century due to their ability to reach far greater numbers of children at a lesser cost. A single
schoolmaster, after imparting the day's lessons to his core of "monitors", could simply sit back
and supervise as they carried out the bulk of the instruction. Of course, the quality of instruction
depended on the presence of sufficient numbers of bright and capable students, and in some cases
was probably only a small improvement over no education at all. Financially, however, the case
was clear. The economy of having only one teacher for an entire school meant that formal
education could reach even the poorest families. This ability to reach a much larger audience
quickly caught the attention of the Church of England, in large part because the first monitorial
schools had been run by a Quaker, Joseph Lancaster, along nondenominational lines. The
prospect of having so many children educated in what was a predominantly secular environment
was anathema to the Church, and so it set about creating its own monitorial system with the
elephantine title of "The National Society for Promoting the Education of the Poor in the
Principles of the Established Church." Wherever Lancaster had founded a school, the National
Society created one of its own with which to compete. Soon the Church of England's network
had grown vastly larger than that of its adversary. In keeping with its other educational efforts,
the Church's monitorial schools were "instituted principally for Educating the Poor in the
Doctrine and Discipline of the Established Church." (National Society, 1972, p. 50) These
schools were not intended to provide children a stepping stone to higher studies, but rather to fit
them to their positions at the bottom of the social and economic hierarchy. In strictly regimented
lessons the pupils were taught to be satisfied with their subservient role in life. Due to this
doctrinaire style and the curricular limitations imposed by the Church, monitorial schools failed
to transform English education. Dame schools and other private ventures continued to reach a
greater number of children than the religious charitable institutions (Royle, 1990).
  By the second half of the 19th century, the governmental role in education had increased
substantially. The main religious educational societies were now subsidized by parliament in an
effort to improve the opportunities of the poor, and state inspectors visited their schools. Friction
was high between Church and state over the proper distribution of regulatory and funding
powers, and many within the government felt there was insufficient emphasis in the schools on
basic subjects and younger grades. In 1862 a "Revised Code" for education was passed into law
with the well-intentioned goal of bringing competition and the profit motive into education. The
"Payment by Results" program, as it came to be known, stipulated that schools should be paid
based on a combination of attendance and student performance on tests administered by state
inspectors. What the Council members failed to understand was that by placing the financial
strings in the hands of state inspectors instead of families, they would pull the attention of
teachers and administrators away from the pupils and towards the government. Failing to satisfy
the inspector meant a significant loss in funding, perhaps even forcing the school out of business,
while receiving a positive review increased the institution's income. Student learning, insofar as
it was not measured by the inspector, was of little financial consequence. The results were tragic.
  Even before the legislation was passed a few observers warned that payment based on a
few simple tests would encourage teachers to curtail their instruction in other subjects. In the
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event, these fears were fully realized. Years after the system had been put into practice, T. H.
Huxley observed: "the Revised Code did not compel any schoolmaster to leave off teaching
anything; but, by the very simple process of refusing to pay for many kinds of teaching, it has
practically put an end to them" (Lawson & Silver, 1973). The testing system consisted of six
separate levels, and since children could not be tested at the same level twice, or at a lower level
from any previous attempt, schools held back older students so that they could be made to
progress through all six levels, bringing in the maximum amount of cash over their educational
lifetime. To ensure top scores at inspection time, teachers adopted frequent testing and
memorization sessions. Often the children were made to learn their entire reading texts by rote so
that they would have the least chance of failing. While some inspectors attempted to subvert
these ploys by supplying an altered text or by asking the student to read backwards, others simply
passed them: "I consider it to be my duty according to the letter of the Code, to pass every child
who can read correctly and with tolerable fluency, whether he or she understand or not a single
sentence or a single word of the lesson" (Smith, 1931). Reports from inspectors repeated the
same criticism time and again, namely, that students were simply being made to memorize words
without understanding their meaning. After years of experience with the system, the Cross
Commission confirmed these views, faulting the teaching of reading under the Revised Code for
being "too mechanical and unintelligent" (Vincent, 1989). Matthew Arnold (1972), the best
known of the inspectors, summed up the consensus among his colleagues:
I find in [English schools], in general, if I compare them with their former selves, a
deadness, a slackness, and a discouragement... If I compare them with the schools of
the continent I find in them a lack of intelligent life much more striking now than it
was when I returned from the continent in 1859.
  Not only the education but even the welfare of many children was sacrificed under this
system. If a child was absent on the day of the inspection, even if gravely ill, the school would
lose his or her attendance allocation. As a result it was not unheard of for school masters to
compel children stricken with serious, even infectious, diseases to attend. One inspector observed
that:
To hear paroxysms of whooping-cough, to observe the pustules of small-pox, to see
infants carefully wrapped up and held in their mothers' arms, or seated on a stool by
the fire because too ill to take their proper places, are events not so rare in an
inspector's experience as they ought to be. The risk of the infant's life, and the danger
of infection to others, are preferred to the forfeiture of a grant of 6s. 6d. (Smith,
1931)
  Teachers, forced by financial necessity to provide only the narrowest education to their
students, lost all spirit and enthusiasm for their work. Their vocation had been reduced to a game
of cat and mouse between the school and the inspector, in which teachers had to learn how to
manipulate the system in order to be successful.
  Despite its significant impact on schooling, the Revised Code was not the government's
most lasting intervention into education. In 1870, W. E. Forster's Education Act added state
provision of schooling to its existing roles in funding and inspection. Local school boards were
created across the country to fill perceived gaps in the existing network of private and subsidized
schools. Over the next several decades, state authority was progressively increased, attendance
was made mandatory for children between ages 5 and 13, and tuition fees were gradually reduced
to zero by 1918.
  Analyzing the changes in literacy and student enrollment that occurred in the 19th century
provides additional insight into the relative roles of independent and state schools. The most
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systematic evidence on literacy during this time period, both in England and elsewhere, is the
frequency with which newlyweds signed their marriage documents-as opposed to simply making
a mark. A strong argument can be made that this measure is more accurately described as a
negative indicator of illiteracy, since the level of writing ability necessary for signing one's name
is minimal, but its usefulness in the absence of other reliable statistical evidence is widely
accepted. What these data show is that literacy increased steadily from 67.3% in 1841 to 93.6%
in 1891, reaching 97.2% by 1900 (West, 1994). In interpreting this evidence it must be kept in
mind that the difference between the mean school leaving age and the mean age of marriage was
approximately 17 years. In other words, the 67.3% literacy rate already existing in 1841 cannot
be attributed in any way to the initiation of state subsidization, which took place only 8 years
earlier. Furthermore, the achievement of 94% literacy in 1891 was accomplished almost entirely
before the Forster Education Act of 1870 had had time to generate an effect on the adult
population. West has also shown that literacy was on the rise well before 1841.
  The trend in school enrollment was substantially similar to that in literacy. The number of
children in schools rose "from 478,000 in 1818 to 1,294,000 in 1834 `without any interposition
of the government or public authorities.'" (West, 1994, p. 172) Between 1841 and 1850, the
number of unsubsidized private schools grew from 688 to 3,754, while subsidized and endowed
schools only increased from 415 to 616. Given the rapid rise in enrollment already under way
prior to 1870, and the fact that subsidized Board Schools drew many of their customers away
from existing private schools, West observes that it is difficult to discern any additional growth
in enrollment that could be reasonably attributed to the Forster Education Act.
  These figures, particularly for the early years of the 19th century, bear witness to the
willingness of even the poorer and less well-educated parents to see to the education of their
children, without state compulsion or supervision. Not only were poor parents sufficiently
responsible to send their children to school, they also demonstrated a commendable level of
selectivity among their various options. The relative failure of subsidized charity schools to
attract parents, as compared to Dame and other fee-charging schools, indicates that parents were
not only able to choose, but were willing to incur a financial burden in order to do so.
 The behavior of teachers in private and subsidized schools is also telling. For more than a
hundred years, the private academies of England were the only option for parents seeking a
modern curriculum in language, technology, and science. The demand for practical instruction in
accounting, surveying, applied sciences, naval skills, and other disciplines key to economic
diversification and a higher standard of living were met almost entirely by private teachers.
Tenured grammar school masters hung onto their limited Latin and Greek curriculum well
beyond its period of usefulness, while religious charity schools often down-played the teaching of
writing. Under the Revised Code, the incentive for subsidized-school teachers to satisfy the needs
of families was further reduced, while a powerful new incentive to satisfy the baseline
requirements of the inspectors was created, with dire results.
France After the Revolution
  French education, even more so than that of other European nations, was the battle ground
for an epic religious and political power struggle. From monarchy to republic and back again, the
revolutionaries strove to use the schools to shore up their position, vying for control with the
firmly entrenched Catholic Church. It seems natural to suppose that on the eve of the revolution,
with its emphasis on human rights and freedoms, the manipulation of education for political and
religious ends would have lessened substantially. This, however, was not the case. The
government that eventually emerged, while revolutionary in many respects, continued the age old
tradition of using schools as a tool. In order to undermine the power of its primary opponent, the
Catholic clergy, parliament severed all ties between education and religion. Nuns and priests
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were ordered to sign a constitution restricting their freedom to teach according to their faith.
Since compliance with this order was difficult to achieve, the government soon resorted to a
more direct approach: outlawing the clergy entirely. In one of history's more remarkable
contradictions, the revolutionaries argued that a truly free nation could suffer no religious or
secular societies amongst its citizens, and so abolished them (Chevallier, 1969). Simply wearing
religious garb became a crime (Gontard, 1959).
  Without a well-organized transitional strategy, schooling quickly began to collapse. Like
Emperor Nero fiddling as Rome burned, the French parliament continued to debate exactly what
the new system should look like as the old one crumbled around them. A genuinely revolutionary
minority defended the right of families to choose their schools, whether sectarian or otherwise,
but their voices were lost amidst a majority who believed the only choice was between moderate
and absolute state control over education. So fervent was the belief in the power of the state and
of the value of forced equality, that proposals for a totalitarian system much like Sparta's were
put forward, in which children were to be taken away from their parents and educated in
government communes. According to the delegate Le Pelletier, "The totality of the child's
existence belongs to us [the state]; the clay, if I may express myself thus, never leaves the mold."
(Ponteil, 1966)
  Eventually a school law was passed, making attendance mandatory and requiring
instructors to sign a "civic certificate" restricting their right to provide sectarian religious
instruction. In place of the old catholic teachings, a new "natural religion" was imposed on the
youth of France. Students were issued catechisms which admonished them to "worship Reason
and the Supreme Being," in the deistic republican fashion (Barnard 1969). Having stripped away
the traditional religious aspects of schooling, parliament had made teaching decidedly
unattractive to the priests and nuns who comprised the vast majority of educators. The supply of
willing teachers was thus reduced to a trickle. Even where teachers were to be found, many
families resented both the intrusion of the state into their lives, and the ouster of Catholicism, and
so kept their children at home. Though government policy had interrupted the existing supply of
education, demand remained largely undiminished. So, in the gap created by the failure of state
schools, independent religious institutions began to reappear. Unsurprisingly, these new schools
were viewed by the republican parliamentary majority as strongholds of fanatics and royalists, to
be "struck down" and "annihilated." The continued affinity of many citizens for traditional
institutions was itself viewed as a sign of ignorance and lack of learning.
  Ten years after the revolution the French educational scene looked like precisely what it
was; a battle field. The general consensus of local officials and national observers was that an
already weak system had been made worse. Report after report flowed into Paris, each lamenting
the sad condition or complete absence of elementary schools. In the midst of this bleak
educational landscape, a small group of philanthropists perceived what they thought might be an
oasis. Having encountered and been impressed by English monitorial schools on a number of
occasions, these men believed the system could help to circumvent the teacher shortage from
which their country was suffering, while also replacing the outdated individual instructional
technique with more effective group teaching. So, in June of 1815, the first French monitorial
school was opened in Paris.
  From its original handful of students the new school rapidly grew to an enrollment in the
hundreds. Its success was widely praised and by the fall several other monitorial schools had
appeared. Beyond the cost-effectiveness of the method, several of its pedagogical innovations
attracted significant attention. Monitorial schools cast aside the existing practice of teaching
reading and writing as entirely distinct skills, with excellent results. They furthermore grouped
students by aptitude in each particular subject rather than strictly by age, allowing the children to
progress through the curriculum at their own pace. Finally, in what seems an obvious move to
modern readers, they taught to entire groups of students at once, rather than individually to each
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child in succession. The one-on- one method, wherein most of the class would devolve into
chaos as the teacher focused his or her attention on a single student, had persisted in most church
and state schools until the advent of the monitorial system. Of course critics aptly pointed out
that the system tended towards excessive regimentation, but the problem was at least less severe
than in the monitorial schools of England's National Society. In practice the advantages of the
approach seem to have outweighed its weaknesses, for mutual instruction, as it became known,
soon spread through France. By January of 1819 there were already 602 monitorial schools. Later
that same year the number had increased an astounding 50%, to 912, and continued growing at
that rate, reaching 1300 schools by February of 1820 (Gontard, 1959). Not only did the system
succeed in opening more schools faster than any previous approach, it was in such great demand
that many existing schools were forced to adopt its techniques in order to compete. "Instructors
following the old method, seeing their pupils desert in order to run to the new one, are hurrying
to adopt it themselves," observed a speaker at the general assembly in Paris (Gontard, 1959).
  Unprecedented in their popularity with the citizenry, monitorial schools were nonetheless
resented by the state and loathed by church. Managed and funded as they were by either secular
private charities or municipal authorities, they enjoyed a significant measure of independence,
making them difficult to manipulate by the established powers. The two most invidious
characteristics of the system, as seen by Church and state, were its secularism and its meritocratic
nature. Supporters of mutual education lauded the fact that it taught children "to obey merit... no
matter who its repository may be," (Fouret & Ozouf, 1982) i.e. to disregard notions of social
class, but the clergy argued that this would subvert the social order (Moody, 1978). The assembly
and the University of Paris also feared they were losing their hold on education, and so set out to
regain it.
  In the years after its founding, the University of Paris had seen its role in primary and
secondary schooling marginalized, and its influence atrophy. With education legislation pending
in the assembly, its governors saw an opportunity to reassert their authority. This task proved
somewhat easier than might be expected due to the fact that most of the of those drafting the
legislation were prominent members of the University, committed to its control over all schools.
The church was still a powerful force, however, and its lobbying won several compromises in the
final law. The legislative patchwork thus created had bits to suit everyone, except, perhaps, the
people of France: The University won a monopoly for granting the newly required teacher
certifications; the Catholic Church was appeased by the requirement for thousands of regional
supervisory committees, which its priests would head; and municipalities, due to their limited
political influence, ended up with a few places on the Church's committees.
  Though nominally meant to ensure the competence of candidates, teacher certification was
entirely divorced from instructional practice. The examiners, usually local college professors
selected by the University, had little knowledge of a primary school environment they had neither
experienced themselves nor perhaps even observed (Ponteil, 1966). Usually too easy and
sometimes too difficult, the uneven certification process was of little help in improving the
quality of instruction.
  Far more damaging than the haphazard certification of teachers was the requirement for
regional school committees. Though headed up by local priests, these committees officially
reported to the University, putting the Church in a subservient role. The clergy chafed at this
limitation of their authority, and fought it with every technique they could devise. In a vast
number of cases they simply refused to convene meetings, preferring to assume personal control
over their local schools and school-masters. In those cases when the members did meet, internal
squabbles were the norm, with the Catholic traditionalists and liberal defenders of mutual
education locked in unswerving opposition to one another. Thanks to their organization and
influence, the priests usually emerged victorious, picking whichever instructor best suited their
needs. It was common for pious and acquiescent school-masters to receive favorable treatment,
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being freed from any legal requirements which might disqualify them from teaching, while those
educators with strong individual wills, or with more liberal views, were persecuted and criticized
in the priests' reports.
  Committee members drawn from the local community were generally of little help in
improving the process. Virtually all were otherwise employed and were neither willing nor able
to spend a significant amount of time on the unsalaried position. With neither the experience nor
the incentive to spur them on, their motivation quickly ebbed. Even proponents of the original
law admitted its failure. In addressing parliament (Archives parlementaires, 1879), one of its
founders, Guizot, made the following pronouncement:
There are 2,846 cantons [in France]... For many years we have expended
considerable effort organizing cantonal committees, but we have managed to create
only 1,031; moreover, these still exist only on paper, there are hardly 200 that have
taken any real action.
  The final nail in the coffin of independent schools was the resurgence of Catholic political
power. In the early 1820's the Church won an important victory, having bishop Frayssinous
appointed Grand Master of the University of Paris, and Minister of Ecclesiastical Affairs and
Public Education. From this new position of influence the Church was able to push through
legislation granting it wide- ranging powers over teachers and schools. Classes were made to
begin and end with prayers, its catechism was to be learned in daily lessons, and teachers were
made increasingly answerable to the local priest. Due to their generally secular nature, and the
fact that their origins lay in English Protestantism, monitorial schools were singled out for the
fiercest attack. Priests leveraged their pulpits, demonizing mutual-teaching and its supporters in
sermon after sermon. After only a few years of this new regime, monitorial schools were all but
extinguished: their numbers were reduced from 1500 in 1821, to 258 by 1827 (Ponteil, 1966).
  For the rest of the nineteenth century, the battle for control of education waged on.
Though primary schooling reached an ever larger segment of the population, its nature at any
given time continued to be decided by the faction with the greatest political clout. The degree of
politicization and centralization of French schooling was well captured by the attitude of
Hippolyte Fortoul, Minister of Ecclesiastical Affairs and Public Education from 1851 to 1856.
Drawing a watch from his pocket he boasted that "At this moment, all the students of the lycees
[secondary schools] are explaining the same passage from Virgil." (Moody, 1978, p. 59) Under
Fortoul, the hours, methods, and content of teaching were all codified. Teachers were forced to
swear an oath of loyalty, support official candidates, and were even prohibited from growing
beards or mustaches.
  Though the more liberal regimes of the eighties and nineties sought to make state
education accessible to the entire nation, they stopped short of letting citizens decide exactly
what kind of education was appropriate. Jules Ferry, nominated minister of public instruction in
1880, believed that all French children had the right to an education, but that the awarding of
degrees must remain the prerogative of the state. This tool, coupled with the government
inspection of all schools, was necessary in his eyes to maintain national unity and a common
morality, and to regulate access to public office. Two national teachers' colleges, founded in
1883, insured a new generation of educators free from the conservative royalist views of the
clergy. (Ponteil, 1966)
 The traditional view of French educational history describes the 19th century as a period in
which increased state intervention led to the expansion of schooling and the wider dispersion of
literacy and culture. Certainly it has been shown that both state schooling and literacy grew
significantly during the 1800's. Grew and Harrigan go somewhat further, concluding that since
the correlation between enrollment and later literacy is larger than the correlation between
literacy and later enrollment, state schooling must have been responsible for some of the growth
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in literacy (1991, p. 72). Even this cautious conclusion is subject to question, however. While
Grew and Harrigan based their conclusion on the literacy figure for a single year, a study
conducted by Furet and Ozouf (1982) looked at the literacy data at several points during the 19th
century. Among their findings was that literacy was widespread in many Northern and Eastern
districts in the 1700s, well before the appearance of state elementary schools. They also found
that in general, areas that had high levels of state school enrollment already had high levels of
literacy before that enrollment could have had an effect. Enrollment of 8 to 12 year olds in 1850,
for example, was already strongly correlated with adult literacy in 1854. In other words, high
levels of literacy and state school enrollment tended to be contemporaneous. Furet and Ozouf
concluded that the relationship between literacy and schooling was to a great extent circular;
literate parents were more likely to seek education for their children, and educated children were
more likely to become literate. The entire process stemmed from a growing demand on the part
of the public for literacy, spawned by the spread of written material and the increasing economic
value of reading and writing. They wrote that:
In the long term, [schooling] is nothing but a product of the demand for education.
Of course, a school founded purely out of individual generosity or at a bishop's
initiative may produce a temporary improvement in education in a parish; but its
chances of enduring and of generating far-reaching changes in cultural patterns are
slim, unless it is not only accepted but actively wanted by the inhabitants. (p. 66)
  The truth of this assessment is attested to by the success of the independent monitorial
schools, which not only flourished in response to popular demand, but led existing institutions to
emulate their innovations. In many cases, these innovations were subsequently discarded by the
state schools. The practice of grouping students by ability, for instance, though supported by
modern research (Kulik, 1992), is rarely seen in schools to this day.
  The battles over control of French schooling did have a significant impact on social
stability, however. In the very area in which many educators tout the superiority government
schooling over competitive market provision-fostering understanding and social harmony-the
outcome appears to have been quite the opposite. Whether by republican parliamentarians or
Catholic monarchists, the state schools were used as a weapon with which to bludgeon their
opponents. In their time in office, the revolutionaries cut the clergy's ties to education in order to
weaken their influence on the people. As the Church rose once again to power, Catholic
teachings were legally forced on the state schools and private secular institutions came under
heated attack. In contrast to this state compulsion, the independent monitorial schools placed no
religious restrictions on their pupils or teachers. They were also the first to integrate children of
upper and lower classes, but far from being supported in this by the educational bureaucracies of
clergy and government, they were fiercely opposed.
Conclusion
  Having described the history of schooling in these four different contexts, it is useful to
see what commonalities present themselves. In particular, it is fruitful to look back at the three
measures of quality listed in the introduction, namely: responsiveness and innovation, direct
benefits, and indirect benefits.
  There is no question that competitive educational markets have been more responsive to
the needs and demands of parents than centrally controlled, subsidized systems. This has held
true whether the monolithic systems have been run and paid for by governments, as was most
commonly the case, or by religious societies. In Athens, changing public demand resulted in
changes to the elementary curriculum, and even led to the creation of secondary education.
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Spartan schooling, both due to implicit features of its organization and to the explicit wishes of
its rulers, kept all innovation and progress at bay for hundreds of years. In pre- reformation
Germany, it was the small private school that was first to offer instruction in the vernacular, both
to adults and children. The state-run schools fostered by Luther and Melanchthon often ignored
the wishes of the public, insisting on a classical course of studies useless to the common man.
The same was true of England's endowed grammar schools. English Dame schools, by contrast,
taught only what parents were willing to pay for, even attracting families away from the
subsidized schools run by religious societies. For centuries, the most sophisticated and modern
instruction in England was to be had at private secondary schools, which introduced the sciences,
practical engineering and surveying techniques, naval skills, and living foreign languages. Before
they were squeezed out of existence by tax-subsidized public schooling, there was simply
nothing that could compare to them. In France, monitorial schools led the way in pedagogical
innovation and in meeting public demands--so much so that other schools were forced to adopt
their methods in order to avoid losing pupils.
  In looking at the direct benefits bestowed on students by different approaches to
educational organization, the clearest distinction to be found is between the practical and the
pointless. Privately financed and operated schools have tended to offer programs of practical
benefit to their clients, while centralized systems have taught only those subjects chosen by their
founders or administrators--in most cases subjects of little value to the average member of the
public. While private schools have consistently taught literacy in the vernacular of their clients
for thousands of years, this has only rarely been the case in state or charity-run schools. When it
was finally taught by the religious societies in England, they often deliberately omitted teaching
writing. Similarly, practical training in mathematics and science has been ignored by bureaucratic
school systems until quite recently, while their history dates back to the 5th century B.C. in
private schools.
  Perhaps the most glaring contradiction between the beliefs of modern public school
advocates and the historical evidence is in the area of indirect or social benefits (also called
positive externalities). Defenders of public schooling argue that only it can preserve social
harmony and a sound economy, while a competitive educational market would lead to social
strife and presumably economic deterioration. Nothing could be further from the truth.
Government-run schools have in fact been far more coercive, and far more likely to lead to social
discord than their private counterparts. Tying themselves to a single religion or ideology, public
schools have often alienated all those who did not share the chosen views. When French
monitorial schools encouraged the intermingling of children of different social classes, and
respecting intellectual merit no matter what its source, they were actually criticized for it by the
ruling powers of public schooling. When English law forbade non-conformists to teach, they
taught nonetheless, privately and illegally, and generally admitted students irrespective of their
religion. Because private schools allowed families the option of pursuing the particular kind of
education they value, conflicts were avoided.
  Whenever the state chooses one world view over all others, it places its own people into
conflict with one another. This has been happening for centuries, and it continues to happen
today. As for indirect economic benefits, there is simply no question. By offering more practical
preparation than their government-run counterparts, private schools have contributed far more,
per capita, to bolstering their national economies.
  One area in which both private and public schools have performed poorly throughout
history, at least by modern standards, is the provision of education for the poor. While it is
possible to trace an historical desire among wealthy individuals to contribute to the education of
the poor, this desire has rarely been effectively translated into action. Government-subsidized
schools, as well as private religious charities, provided easier access to educational services than
unsubsidized private institutions, but these services were not generally based on the needs and
22 of 28
demands of the families they served. This is evident from situations such as the one in
Manchester where free and subsidized schools held only a small share of the market, and, despite
having empty places available, still lost potential customers to their unsubsidized competition.
To a certain extent, poor parents have thus had to choose between the private schools that met
their needs and the subsidized schools they could more readily afford, with little intersection
between the two.
  The import of the historical evidence for modern schooling is clear. Competition and the
profit motive must be reintroduced into education so that teachers and school administrators will
once again have a powerful incentive to meet the needs of the children and parents they serve. It
can also be expected that the elimination of existing educational monopolies will alleviate many
of the ongoing battles over curriculum and religion in the schools, by allowing families to pursue
an education in accordance with their own values, without the need to impose those values on
others. What remains to be resolved is the question of how to integrate the reintroduction of
market forces with the subsidization of families with limited financial means. Vouchers and
tax-credits no doubt offer a viable approach to the problem, though the need for more work in the
design and application of these plans is paramount.
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Contributed Commentary on
Volume 4 Number 9: Coulson Markets Versus Monopolies in Education: The Historical
Evidence
17 July 1996 
William J. Hunter
hunter@acs.ucalgary.ca
 Markets Versus Monopolies in Education: The Historical Evidence is a well written and 
clearly argued polemic. In it, Andrew Coulson puts together a rather lengthy chain of stories
about the place of "market forces" in the delivery of education al services from the time of the
Greeks forward. It is understandable that his observations are limited to social and political
systems that were large and well organized since his aim is to discuss education in the context of
schools. A quite different p icture would appear if one considered "education" in less complex
and technological societies, but such education differs in its aims as well as in its substance from 
the kinds of academic program that is of interest to Coulson in this work. The paper is presented
as a history and it may seem unfortunate that it relies so frequently on secondary sources;
however, Coulson's aim seems not to be to shed new light on history but to draw implications
from known history so the secondary sources do not present a serious problem.
The history presented is stimulating reading, but the author's conclusions are perhaps too amply
foreshadowed by the evaluative language used throughout. An early example occurs in Coulson's
description of "the case against" parental choice and inter-school competition: "A significant
number of parents, it is assumed, would either fail to inform themselves about competing
schools, or would base their choices on the 'wrong' criteria'." The author's preferences are
revealed in this statement in several ways. First of all, most writers would be inclined to describe
the case in favor of an innovation first so that the arguments against might be understood in 
context. Coulson prefers to write first about the case against so that the "the case in favor" may
serve as rebuttal and, I would presume, to gain the benefits of the recency effect in the reader's 
memory. Second, the use of scare quotes around "wrong" seems to imply that the criteria that
would be chosen ar e indeed NOT wrong. Finally, the choice of "it is assumed" as opposed to "it
is claimed" or "it is argued" presents this proposition as an ideological presumption rather than as
an empirically testable claim.
It seems to me too that there is something crafty in Coulson's use of references to minority groups
advocates for an educational free market as the opening paragraph of the case in favor. Even
reading from outside the United States, I recognize Ben Chav is as a very conservative writer
whose own Horatio Alger life experience leaves him inclined to expect that individual hard work
and determination invariably result in just rewards. While I do not know the other parties
Coulson cites, this one is enough to suggest that he has been exceedingly selective in his choice
of representatives for a minority point of view. 
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The effects of such a presentation can be powerfully persuasive and I expect that this article will
prove persuasive to many readers. As I said earlier, it is a well written and clearly argued
polemic, but readers should bear in mind that from the outset, the author is taking a stand and
seeking to persuade. This is not simply "the historical evidence" as the title claims. It is some of 
the historical evidence presented in the context of the author's unshakable faith in free market
forces as a basis for educational reform. As such it is both a good read and a good exercise for a
critical intellect, but the reader should really be alerted to the author's intentions at the beginning 
rather having his conclusions appear as if they arose from the data presented. The conclusions
are, I think, far too strong for the data. I appreciate the paragraph dealing with the inadequacies of
market systems in providing for the education of the poor, Coulson could go a lot further in
making clear exactly who was educated in each of the historical systems he presented. Not only
was much of the education he discusses limited to males, it was also often limited to "citizens" 
which frequently meant landowners. Great masses of children would not likely have been
covered by any of the education the author speaks of but would have been left to fend for
themselves without benefit of education. Moreover, the author's recognition of this problem does
not prevent him or her from asserting that "Competition and the profit motive must be
reintroduced into education so that teachers and school administrators will once again have a 
powerful incentive to meet the needs of the children and parents they serve." The conclusion
assumes that schools do not now address the needs of children and parents, a proposition about
which a charitable assessment (from any political view) might be that the evidence is mixed.
I will not attempt to treat each of the historical periods that Coulson discusses, but I would like to 
illustrate how the facts of his presentation might lend themselves to alternate interpretations.
Take, for example, Coulson's passing comment: "...Plato's Academy and Aristotle's Lyceum,
neither of which charged a fee due to the wealth and preferences of their founders..." While it
introduces a section on for-profit schooling in Athens, it also makes a point about the role of
generous benefactors in providing schooling. Such claims are often part of the rationale of
contemporary private schools that seek scholarships to support the tuition of able but needy 
students. This happens, of course, and students no doubt benefit. But the generosity of Plato or
Aristotle might also be seen as a precedent for the generosity of today's elite. Suppose, for
example, that in a school system given over to the free market, Ross Perot or Ted Turner were to
offer free schooling to some large number of students. Would we be prepared to have those
schools become vehicles for the promulgation of a particular set of political principles? On the
other hand, the American Communist Party in the 1930's was very generous in support of a
variety of charities--suppose communist interests, domestic or foreign, wanted to establish 
private schools with little or no tuition. Would we be prepared to impose severe regulations on 
the ownership and operation of private schools to insure that they did not serve narrow political
interests or would we be prepared to take it as an article of faith that market competition would 
address such problems?
An alternate interpretation might also be given to Luther's concern that "if we leave it (education)
to the parents, we will die a hundred times over before the thing would be done." Coulson clearly
sees this as simply wrong-headed thinking--it is an article of faith for him that parents will in fact
make good choices for their children. But if we allow that Luther may have known something of
the people he was talking about, it is not unreasonable to consider that the child's labor for the
famil y farm or business might have been far to valuable to sacrifice for an education. The "good
choice" for most peasant families might well have been to choose food over literacy. Given the
availability of low-paying jobs in the service industry today, families could just as readily decide
that a sixteen year old's income is a better bargain than paying for schooling. Are we prepared to
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either decrease the school leaving age or to accept higher dropout rates? My point is only this:
however clear the facts of history may seem to be, its lessons are invariably ambiguous.
Finally, while there is certainly ample food for thought in the historical antecedents, Coulson
would do well to inform readers about the differences between contemporary democracies and 
the states that supported the public education systems described in this piece. We ought not
minimize the differences in social ecology that make simple generalizations from the past 
inappropriate.
This article is informative and provocative. I would not want readers to be left with only
Coulson's interpretation of the "the historical evidence," but I think both his perspective and his 
arguments merit consideration.
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David O'Keefe
D.T.O-Keefe@sussex.ac.uk
 Hopefully it's not to late to respond to Coulson's 'Markets Versus Monopolies in
Education'. 
1. It's an interesting and clearly written paper. 
2. He has chosen interesting examples, though I question the relevance of examples from Sparta
and Athens. 
3. My main point: It is possible (and I think wise) to read his paper as an argument for
'decentralization' rather than 'privitization'. Decentralization is, after all, one of the many forms of
privitization (see Bray, Mark (various recent years)). Decentralization is not a market response,
rather it is about delegating authority to the local level. It is possible to decentralize curriculum
decisions (thereby presumably making the curriculum more relevant) without privitizing the
finance of education. This may be the best solution. In fact, there is generally more local control
of education in the US than elsewhere in the world. For example, there is no national curriculum
and local school boards have genuine power to effect change.
  The concern I have about market solutions to education is of the danger that ability to pay
will determine the quality of education one receives. Of course, already in the US, income clearly
determines educational choice at all levels (see 'Savage Inequalities'). Further, I worry about the
hidden agenda of market solutions which I believe is to break teacher unions. Have we
collectively forgotten why teacher unions (and unions generally) arose? Does anyone believe that
the world has changed since then in such a way as to obviate the need for organized labor in
response to organized capital?
  Rather, it seems that as capital has become more organized (resulting, inter alia, in GATT,
the EC, and NAFTA), labor has become less so (see Freeman, Richard). We seem to have arrived
at a very unhealthy level of political inequality between capital and labor. Not surprisingly, this
seems to have resulted in the majority of people working more with less security and for a
declining share of total income, with consequent societal effects.
  Broadly, it seems to me that the 'market solution/privitization' agenda that has dominated
the US since, say, 1980 has had numerous, rather ugly side effects. Among these are: 
  1. The dramatic rise in income inequality to historically record levels. 
  2. The stagnation of average wages. 
  3. The marked real decline in the minimum wage and social welfare benefits. 
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  4. The rise in violent and drug-related crime, in response to which the US has imprisoned
a higher proportion of its population than any other country in the world. 
  These seem obviously related to each other and to have obviously resulted from
privatization and market solutions. Certainly, they have coincided with the rise of the
privitization/market solutions agenda.
  Are Americans satisfied with these results? Has the American society become a 'better
society' (however that is defined)? It seems to me that as the increasingly privitized American
society has become qualitatively worse (in my view), so too will increasingly privitized education
become worse. This is not to say that greater decentralization of educational decision making is
anything but good. 
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Sherman Dorn
dornsj@CTRVAX.VANDERBILT.EDU
  Proponents of vouchers frequently point to higher education as a model of how vouchers
might work on the K-12 level and, more importantly, cite it as evidence that vouchers need not
degrade the quality of education. On the contrary, they would legitimately point out, the GI Bill
allowed American universities (or multiversities, as Clark Kerr declared) to expand and become
a leader in higher education throughout the world. In other words, voucher proponents invite us
to consider a gedanken (or thought) experiment: what would K-12 look like if it were like
American higher education?
  I'm going to skip here the responses one might make about whether we like the shape of
American higher education, what happened when federal loan and grant money started going to
beauty schools and other proprietary institutions, and so forth. Let's grant for the moment that the
shape of higher education is a reasonable best-case scenario, and that it probably would not be
worse to end up with something like that compared with the current configuration of K-12.
Instead, I have a different question: can we identify today what would be a worst-case scenario
for vouchers, what Herb Gintis called "fatal compromises" that would make K-12 much worse
than the admittedly flawed status quo?
  I assert that day care as currently exists in the United States is a very good example of
what the worst-case scenario might be for K-12 education if privatized. Currently, most states
have some subsidies available for day care for poor families. These subsidies cover only a
fraction of children across the state who need child care, and they cover only a fraction of the
cost of good child care. A number of corporations have sprouted across the country providing
child care either as franchises appealing to parents (e.g., KinderCare) or as subcontractees of
corporations (e.g., Corporate Child Care). Standards for child care are spotty across the country.
When the Tennessee commission on child care standards recently suggested mild revisions to
existing standards, it got bottled up because it would have made the governor's welfare proposal
much more expensive. (It would have required such unreasonable things as having someone on
site with CPR/rescue training, a 6:1 toddler:teacher ratio, and the elimination of a vast loophole
which allowed child care centers essentially to ignore the ratio standards which currently exist.)
(I should also mention that there are no standards in Tennessee for child care provided in private
homes.)
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  In other words, child care is a pretty lousy privated system with poor public subsidies and
weak standards. This despite the growth of professional organizations such as NAEYC. I would
argue that, if K-12 is privatized, it might turn into the equivalent of child care. Not necessarily,
but it's a possibility.
  Moreover, child care conditions in most states demonstrate the avowed hypocrisy of
politicians who support vouchers. Many of those supporting vouchers are the same ones who
refuse to support more subsidies for child care. NO ONE is arguing, to my knowledge, that child
care is satisfactory or that child care centers waste money. (Putting about 80% or so into salaries
for teachers, they're probably among the most efficient places around.) Politicians just don't want
to spend money on child care, and the thousands of parents who need it haven't changed the
behavior of state legislatures. I suspect that, if K-12 is privatized, the same instincts will govern
political behavior. Political rhetoric will put more downward pressure on school funding, more
pressure than currently exists, and there will not be the countervailing influence of funding
structures that we now have. To any politicians supporting vouchers, I'd say, "Put your money
where your mouth is. Support increased subsidies and standards for child care in your state, and
I'll believe that you're serious about having a good privatized system. Because we should make
the privatized system we have good before we think about privatizing K-12."
